Michael Brodsky’s interview became an important conversation not only about diplomacy but also about the maturation of relations between Ukraine and Israel. It touched on topics that are rarely convenient to discuss publicly: illusions, military technologies, anti-Semitism, the Holocaust, and the limits of political support.
Ukraine after 2021: a country changed by war more deeply than it seems
The interview of Ukrainian journalist Yuriy Romanenko with the Israeli ambassador to Ukraine Michael Brodsky, released on the channel Yuriy Romanenko on June 8, 2026, is important not only as a diplomatic conversation before the ambassador’s mission ends in August. It is a conversation about how Ukraine and Israel have gone through disappointments, inflated expectations, mutual limitations, and have come to a more sober understanding of each other over the years.
Brodsky arrived in Ukraine in August 2021. At that time, the country was still living in a different political and psychological reality. There were months left before Russia’s full-scale invasion, but many processes that seem obvious today were not yet visible in full force.
According to the ambassador, it was not his stereotypes about Ukraine that changed — Ukraine itself changed. This is an important formula because it shifts the conversation from the realm of personal impressions to the realm of historical turning points. The country he saw in 2021 and the country he is saying goodbye to in 2026 are no longer the same society.
The war changed Ukraine not only in military terms.
It changed the population map, internal migration, attitudes towards security, trust in external partners, expectations from allies, and the very understanding of the state. Brodsky talks about the flows of people who moved from the east to the center and west, about human tragedy, and about a country that has lost a huge part of its former normalcy.
For the Israeli audience, this logic is understandable. Israel also lives in a situation where security is not an abstract budget section but a condition for the country’s existence. After October 7, 2023, this reality became even harsher. Therefore, Brodsky’s conversation about Ukraine sounds not like a cold diplomatic report but as a perspective from someone from a country that knows what it means to live under threat.
The disappearance of illusions: about Russia, partners, and one’s own expectations
One of Brodsky’s main theses is that Ukraine has lost many illusions.
First of all, it concerns Russia. Until 2022, there were still different perceptions in Ukrainian society about the ‘northern neighbor,’ about the possibility of reaching an agreement, about cultural closeness, about the past that supposedly could prevent a major war. After February 24, 2022, this perspective was shattered.
But more importantly, the war destroyed not only illusions about Russia. It also destroyed inflated expectations from partners.
At this point, Brodsky speaks particularly frankly about Israel. At the beginning of the full-scale war, many in Ukraine looked at Israel through the myth of the ‘Iron Dome.’ In the Ukrainian public sphere, the logic often sounded: if Israel has a famous air defense system, then it can cover the Ukrainian sky.
Brodsky explains that this was a distorted perception.
‘Iron Dome’ is not a magical dome over the country. It is a specific missile system effective against a certain type of threat, primarily short-range missiles. It is not designed to cover a vast territory from all possible missiles, ballistics, aviation, drones, and combined attacks.
This is where the maturation of Ukrainian-Israeli relations begins.
When one side expects the impossible, and the other cannot or is not ready to provide it, grievances arise. When the parties begin to understand each other’s real capabilities, there is room for genuine politics.
Ukraine has come to better understand Israel’s limitations. Israel has come to better understand the scale of the Ukrainian war. And this, according to Brodsky’s words, does not make the relationship simpler, but it makes it more honest.
Where Ukraine and Israel can truly become closer
The main positive thesis of the interview is that the potential for cooperation between Ukraine and Israel is not exhausted. Moreover, it can become much more serious precisely after both countries have gone through difficult wars and abandoned some illusions.
Brodsky sees the main potential not in beautiful declarations but in the military-technical sphere.
It is about air defense, drones, anti-drone protection, military technologies, and the ability to quickly turn combat experience into practical solutions. This is the area where Ukraine and Israel can truly be useful to each other.
Israel has been building its defense technological culture for decades under constant threat conditions. When there is no guarantee that others will provide everything necessary, the country is forced to invent on its own. When enemies are nearby, technologies are tested not at exhibitions but in reality.
Ukraine after 2022 found itself in a similar logic.
It cannot wait for perfect solutions. It has to quickly develop, test, redo, scale, and test again. This is especially evident in the topic of drones, where the Ukrainian war has become one of the toughest testing grounds for the modern military technological revolution.
For NAnovosti Israel News Nikk.Agency, this part of the interview is especially important: it shows that Ukrainian-Israeli relations can move from the emotional format of ‘why didn’t you give’ to the practical format of ‘what can we create together.’
Air defense and drones: not symbols, but a matter of survival
In this conversation, air defense is not a technical detail. It is a matter of people’s lives.
Ukraine lives under Russian missile and drone attacks. Israel, after October 7, lives with threats from Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and other forces that use missiles, drones, combined attacks, and proxy networks.
These wars are different. They cannot be mechanically compared.
Ukraine has one geography, one scale of the front, one depth of territory, and one type of enemy. Israel has a different territory, different population density, different borders, and a different threat system. But the technological logic is similar: the enemy looks for a weak spot, attacks cheaper, faster, more massively, and the defense is forced to respond smarter.
Brodsky acknowledges that Ukraine faced a large-scale drone war before Israel. Israel, especially in the northern direction, has already seen how serious this problem is becoming. Hezbollah actively uses drones, and part of the threats resembles what Ukrainian soldiers see every day on their front.
In this sense, the Ukrainian experience for Israel can be no less important than the Israeli experience for Ukraine.
Ukraine knows how to work with massiveness, field solutions, rapid changes in tactics. Israel knows how to build technological ecosystems, connecting the army, engineers, business, the state, and the export market. If these two schools are connected not formally but genuinely, the result can be serious.
Ukraine repeats Israel’s path — but on its own scale
One of Brodsky’s strongest thoughts is that Ukraine in many ways repeats Israel’s path.
Not in a political sense and not as a historical copy. Ukraine is not becoming a ‘second Israel,’ and such comparisons often oversimplify reality. But there is a similar logic: a country faced with the threat of destruction begins to build its own defense culture.
Israel went through this for decades.
Lack of weapons, limited resources, the need to defend here and now, dependence on external partners, but at the same time understanding that in a critical moment, one must rely primarily on oneself. From this grew the Israeli defense industry, intelligence capabilities, startup culture, military medicine, cybersecurity, and a system of constant adaptation.
Ukraine is now going through its version of this path.
Only it is doing so in much more compressed timeframes and against the backdrop of a full-scale war against Russia. In Ukrainian conditions, military technologies are developing not out of comfort and not out of a desire to occupy the market. They are developing because otherwise, people, cities, infrastructure, and the army perish.
This is a very important point for the Israeli audience.
It explains why Ukraine today is not only a recipient of aid. Ukraine is becoming a bearer of experience that may be needed by other countries, including Israel. This changes the psychology of relations. Kyiv is no longer just asking. Kyiv can share what it has gained at a terrible cost.
Relations without romance: why maturity is more important than slogans
Ukrainian-Israeli relations have never been simple. Brodsky directly says that this is not a case where everything between the countries is rosy, clear, and cloudless.
This is the value of the interview.
It does not paint a decorative friendship. It shows the relations of two countries that have common interests, common pains, common enemies in certain directions, but also have different geopolitical circumstances, different limitations, and different historical traumas.
Ukraine wanted more from Israel at the beginning of the war.
Israel expected Ukraine to better understand its limitations.
After October 7, it became easier for Ukrainian society to understand why Israel makes decisions through the prism of security. But it also became harder for Israel not to see how difficult a war Ukraine is waging against Russia.
Thus, a more honest foundation emerges.
Not ‘we must always agree.’ Not ‘we must remain silent about the difficult.’ Not ‘we are owed everything.’ But something else: we have areas where we can be stronger together, and there are topics that need to be discussed without self-deception.
Two wars, one logic of constant adaptation
Ukraine and Israel today are in different wars, but both countries live in a mode of continuous adaptation.
Ukraine adapts to Russian pressure: the front, the rear, energy, mobilization, drones, missiles, international aid, partner fatigue, information warfare.
Israel adapts to the consequences of October 7, threats from Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, Yemen, Syria, to the pressure of international opinion, to internal trauma, and to the need to simultaneously protect citizens and maintain strategic alliances.
This is why Brodsky’s conversation sounds like a bridge between two experiences.
He does not say that Ukraine and Israel are the same. He talks about how both countries understand the cost of war not from reports but from life. This can become the basis for deeper cooperation.
Anti-Semitism, Russian disinformation, and painful memory
But Brodsky’s interview is important not only for its military part. It contains another large block — anti-Semitism, historical memory, and topics that are often removed from the conversation for political convenience.
Brodsky talks about the law against anti-Semitism in Ukraine. His position is simple: a civilized country must have tools to combat anti-Semitism and hate crimes based on national hatred.
He emphasizes an important distinction: criticizing Israel is possible. This is not anti-Semitism.
But attacking a synagogue, anti-Semitic statements, incitement, hatred of Jews, or trying to present a crime based on anti-Semitism as ordinary ‘hooliganism’ is a different story. Such things must be called by their names.
For Ukraine, this is especially important.
Russian propaganda has been trying for years to use the Jewish theme against Ukraine: either through accusations of ‘Nazism,’ through conspiracy theories, through attempts to pit Ukrainians and Jews against each other, or through disinformation that Israel allegedly has some hidden plans regarding Ukrainian territory.
‘Heavenly Jerusalem’: conspiracy as a weapon against trust
In the interview, the topic of the so-called ‘Heavenly Jerusalem’ is separately mentioned. Brodsky calls this idea wild and insane.
And this is not just an emotional reaction.
Such myths work as informational weapons. They do not have to be logical. Their task is not to explain reality but to infect society with suspicion. To sow the thought that Jews, Israel, or some ‘hidden forces’ are allegedly using the war in Ukraine for their own secret plans.
This is an old anti-Semitic mechanism in a new package.
First, a fantastic plot is created. Then it is repeated by bots, marginal channels, pseudo-experts, and people who themselves do not understand that they are becoming part of an enemy information operation. Then this plot begins to surface under any news where there is Israel, Jews, Ukraine, Zelensky, Abramovich, diplomacy, or war.
Brodsky cautiously says that it is not always possible to clearly separate a planned operation from spontaneous user reactions. But he acknowledges the fact of a large number of anti-Semitic comments, including under publications of the Israeli embassy, as alarming.
And here is an important conclusion for Ukrainian society.
The fight against Russian propaganda is not only about refuting fakes about the front. It is also about protecting internal trust. If pro-Russian or anti-Semitic conspiracy theories start working within the Ukrainian discourse, they hit not only Jews. They hit Ukraine itself because they make it vulnerable to manipulation.
Historical memory: supporting Ukraine does not mean silence
The most painful block of the interview is related to historical memory.
Brodsky talks about the heroization of figures who are perceived in Israel through their connection with the Nazi regime, the Holocaust, and the idea of Ukraine without Jews. The conversation touches on the topic of Melnyk, the reaction of Yad Vashem, the position of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, and the question of why such plots repeatedly become a problem in Ukraine’s relations with Israel and Poland.
Here Brodsky’s position is tough but important.
Israel supports Ukraine in the war against Russia. Israel votes for Ukraine on international platforms. Israel provides assistance and, according to the ambassador, will continue to support Ukraine.
But this does not mean that Israel will remain silent on issues of historical memory.
For Israel, the topic of the Holocaust on Ukrainian soil is not an external story. It is part of the history of the Jewish people. About one and a half million Jews were exterminated on the territory of Ukraine during World War II. Therefore, when actions appear in Ukraine that are perceived in Israel as the heroization of people associated with the Nazi regime, Jerusalem considers itself entitled to react.
This is an unpleasant conversation. But mature relations are impossible without such conversations.
Ukraine has its tragic history of struggle for statehood. Israel has its historical memory of the Catastrophe. These two memories do not always easily combine in the political space, especially during war. But if they are not discussed professionally, honestly, and without propagandistic clichés, each new episode will turn into a diplomatic crisis.
Brodsky reminds that even before the full-scale war, he proposed creating a historical commission that could translate such disputes from the political plane to the professional one. This idea, judging by his words, was not implemented. Perhaps, unfortunately.
For NAnovosti Israel News Nikk.Agency, this moment is especially important because Ukrainian-Israeli relations cannot be built only on current politics. There is always a third participant in them — memory. Memory of the Jews of Ukraine, memory of the Holocaust, memory of the struggle of Ukrainians against empires, memory of Soviet and Russian violence, memory of those who found themselves between different tragedies of the 20th century.
Yad Vashem and ‘Myrotvorets’: why this episode became a signal
Separately, Brodsky talks about the inclusion of the director of Yad Vashem in the ‘Myrotvorets’ database. He calls this nonsense and an unfriendly step.
According to him, Israel sent a note requesting clarification of the situation. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry responded that Ukraine values its ties with Yad Vashem and does not influence the actions of this public organization. Formally, this is an important explanation. But politically, the episode still left an unpleasant mark.
Brodsky says that the director of Yad Vashem planned to visit Ukraine for the 85th anniversary of Babi Yar in the fall of 2026. After such a situation, according to him, this visit was called into question.
This is not a technical detail.
For Israel, Yad Vashem is not just a museum or research center. It is one of the main institutions of national memory of the Holocaust. Therefore, any actions around Yad Vashem are perceived in Israel very sensitively.
In such a situation, it is important for Ukraine to understand not only the legal side but also the symbolic one. Even if the state formally does not control a particular platform, diplomatic damage can still occur.
What this interview says about the future of Ukraine and Israel
The main conclusion from Brodsky’s interview is that the relations between Ukraine and Israel are entering a more mature stage.
This is no longer a stage of simple expectations.
Not a stage when Ukraine expects the ‘Iron Dome’ from Israel as a universal salvation. Not a stage when Israel can view the Ukrainian war only as a distant European crisis. Not a stage when painful topics of historical memory can be postponed forever because ‘now is not the time.’
On the contrary, it is now becoming clear: if Ukraine and Israel want to be closer, they need to build relationships based on reality.
Reality one: Ukraine has changed by war and has become a country with vast military experience.
Reality two: Israel also lives in a state of war and cannot make decisions without considering its own security.
Reality three: the two countries have a powerful field for cooperation — air defense, drones, protection against drones, military technologies, medicine, cybersecurity, recovery, resilience of cities and infrastructure.
Reality four: Russian aggression, the Iranian factor, Hamas, Hezbollah, and other threats do not exist separately from each other. The world is becoming more interconnected, and military technologies, propaganda, and alliances of enemies quickly transition from one region to another.
Reality five: historical memory will not disappear. Israel can support Ukraine against Russia while simultaneously criticizing the heroization of figures associated with the tragedy of the Holocaust in Jewish memory. Ukraine can expect support from Israel but must understand that for the Jewish people, the memory of one and a half million Jews exterminated on Ukrainian soil is not a secondary issue.
From grievances to pragmatism
The most valuable aspect of Brodsky’s conversation is the absence of decorativeness.
He does not try to present Ukrainian-Israeli relations as ideal. He does not hide that there were inflated expectations. He does not avoid anti-Semitism. He does not pretend that historical memory does not influence politics. Yet, he does not put an end to the partnership.
On the contrary, his words suggest: it is precisely after disappointments that there is a chance for a stronger connection.
And this is possibly the main lesson for Kyiv and Jerusalem.
An alliance does not always start with romance. Sometimes it begins with a tough conversation about who can do what, who cannot do what, who was wrong, and where there is real mutual benefit.
Ukraine and Israel can become closer not because they have no problems, but because they are finally starting to talk about them more directly.
Why this is important for the Israeli audience
For Israelis, the Ukrainian topic often seems distant, although in reality, it is very close.
Jewish memory lives in Ukraine. Many Israeli families originate from there. There are cities, towns, cemeteries, synagogues, sites of mass shootings, Babyn Yar, Uman, Odessa, Kyiv, Lviv, Dnipro, Kharkiv, and dozens of other points connected with the history of the Jewish people.
But today Ukraine is not only the past.
It is a country fighting against Russia, developing military technologies, protecting its cities from missiles and drones, combating Russian propaganda, and trying to maintain the state under enormous pressure.
For Israel, this is not an unfamiliar experience.
Israel also knows what it means to explain to the world its right to defense. Israel also knows what it is like to live under the threat of missiles, drones, and terrorist attacks. Israel also knows how quickly international sympathy can turn into criticism when the war becomes long and complex.
Therefore, Brodsky’s conversation is important not only for Ukraine. It is also important for Israel because it shows that the Ukrainian experience can be part of the Israeli understanding of the new war.
Final conclusion
Michael Brodsky’s interview is not just a diplomatic summary of his mission in Ukraine. It is a fixation of a new stage in relations between Ukraine and Israel.
At this stage, it is no longer enough to speak in general terms about friendship, support, and common values. Concrete solutions are needed: in air defense, drones, anti-drone protection, technologies, recovery, experience exchange, and citizen protection.
But honest conversations are also needed.
About why Ukraine expected more from Israel than Israel was ready to give. About why Israel should look more closely at the Ukrainian experience of modern warfare. About how Russian propaganda uses anti-Semitism and conspiracy theories to destroy trust. About why historical memory remains part of politics, even when both countries talk about the future.
Ukraine and Israel, after 2022 and 2023, have come to better understand the cost of security. But precisely because of this, their relations should be built not on myths, but on honesty.
Honesty is not always convenient.
But only it gives a chance to turn a complicated friendship into a real partnership.
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